Heterogeneity and learning with complete markets by Sergio Santoro
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)


















1   Temi di discussione
(Working papers)
Heterogeneity and learning with complete markets
by Sergio Santoro
Number 806 - April 2011The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial  Board:  Marcello  Pericoli,  Silvia  Magri,  Luisa  Carpinelli,  Emanuela 
Ciapanna, Daniela Marconi, Andrea Neri, Marzia Romanelli, Concetta Rondinelli, 
Tiziano Ropele, Andrea Silvestrini.
Editorial Assistants: Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti.HETEROGENEITY AND LEARNING WITH COMPLETE MARKETS 
 
by Sergio Santoro* 
 
Abstract 
We study an endowment economy with complete markets and heterogeneous agents 
who do not have rational expectations, but form their beliefs using adaptive learning 
algorithms that may differ from one individual to another. We show that market 
completeness allows agents to smooth consumption across states of nature, but not across 
time, and that the initial wealth distribution is not enough to pin down the long-run 
equilibrium. Consequently, initial differences in beliefs create persistent consumption 
imbalances that are not grounded in fundamentals. In some cases these imbalances are 
eventually unsustainable: the debt of one of the agents would grow without bounds, and 
binding borrowing limits are necessary to prevent Ponzi schemes. Finally, we find that our 
slight departure from rational expectations affects efficiency properties of the competitive 
equilibrium: if the social welfare function attaches fixed Pareto weights to the different 
individuals, there are configurations of individual expectations under which society is better 
off with financial autarky than with complete markets. The first best can be restored by 
introducing a distortionary tax on borrowing, which transfers consumption from the more 
optimistic agent to the other. 
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In general equilibrium models where agents receive idiosyncratic income shocks,
the possibility to trade a complete set of state-contingent bonds works as an ef-
fective insurance device, allowing each individual to smooth consumption across
states and across time in a way that eliminates the impact of agent-specic shocks.
This \risk sharing" property implies that, for any initial wealth distribution, in-
dividual consumption is a well-dened, stationary function of aggregate shocks
only, and that the competitive equilibrium achieves the rst best, hence providing
a rationale for nancial innovation in the form of creating new instruments and
opening up new markets.
These ndings critically hinge on the assumption of rational expectations:
agents have perfect knowledge of their own optimization problem, are capable
of solving it, and know that all the other agents in the economy share the same
degree of rationality. As a consequence, all subjective beliefs coincide with the
objective expectations. However, a growing body of empirical evidence questions
the assumption that expectations are rational and homogeneous among agents.
Early results in this spirit can be found in Roberts (1998), where the forecasts of
US agents collected in the Michigan and Livingston surveys are shown to be incon-
sistent with the hypothesis of purely rational expectations; instead, they provide
evidence in favor of an intermediate degree of rationality, with beliefs partly ex-
plained by a simple form of backward-looking expectations. More recently, Branch
(2004) and Branch (2007) show evidence suggesting that models featuring hetero-
geneous beliefs, and which allow the degree of heterogeneity to change over time,
provide a better t of survey data. Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) analyze the Michi-
gan survey micro data on ination expectations, documenting the fact that agents
in dierent percentiles of the survey seem to be associated with dierent forecasting
schemes. Moreover, several papers have shown that in many setups such depar-
tures from rational expectations are not innocuous. To recall only few examples,
in the context of monetary policy it has been argued that interest rate rules that
are optimal or guarantee determinacy under RE, can lead to instability if private
expectations follow adaptive learning (see Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and
Honkapohja (2003a), Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) and Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2006)). In an asset pricing model, Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2009) show
how a small departure from rational expectations signicantly helps in matching
numerous empirical facts.
1I thank Francesco Caprioli and Giuseppe Ferrero for useful conversations. A previous version
of this paper has been presented at the conference on \Expectations, Asset Bubbles and Financial
Crises", held in the Erasmus University of Rotterdam; I would like to thank the audience for
the comments. All remaining errors are my own. The views expressed herein are those of the
author, and do not necessarily reect those of the Eurosystem or of the Banca d'Italia.
5In this paper we take a normative point of view, and assess the robustness
of typical properties of complete markets when we slightly depart from rational
expectations. In particular, we endow each agent with a full understanding of her
own optimization problem, of the asset market structure, and of the probability
distribution of the exogenous shocks, while she does not know if other individuals
have the same degree of rationality: hence, she is not sure if her subjective beliefs
turn out to coincide with objective expectations. Instead, she computes forecasts
of next period's contingent consumption according to an estimated model which
is correctly specied, in the sense that nests rational expectations as a particular
case, and updates the estimates using an algorithm commonly used in the adaptive
learning literature (for an extensive monograph on adaptive learning, see Evans
and Honkapohja (2001)). To prevent Ponzi schemes, we also impose debt limits
that would never bind under rational expectations, close in spirit to the natural
debt limits introduced in Aiyagari (1994).
We nd that in our framework consumption is smoothed across states but not
across time: in each period agents consume fractions of the aggregate endowment
that are independent of the realizations of idiosyncratic shocks, but are not con-
stant over time. In particular, they depend on past beliefs in a persistent way:
heterogeneity in initial beliefs does not fade away asymptotically, and agents' ex-
pectations (and the consumption distribution) can converge to dierent equilibria,
depending on initial beliefs and on aggregate shocks. The fact that consumption
is not smoothed across time does not mean that anything can happen: in order to
be able to repay her debt, if in some periods an household consumes more than
in the rational expectations benchmark, then in other periods she must consume
less.
We show that this type of dynamics would not be guaranteed by the evolution
of beliefs for a relevant set of initial conditions of the learning process. In these
cases the expectations-driven consumption imbalances are not sustainable forever,
and the debt limit of one of the agents becomes binding in nite time, forcing her
to cut consumption.
Moreover, our slight departure from rational expectations also aects eciency
properties of the competitive equilibrium, and suggests that dierences in individ-
ual beliefs should be taken into account by policymakers when designing nancial
innovation. In fact, if we consider a social planner that attaches to the dierent
agents xed Pareto weights2, we show that there exist congurations of individual
expectations such that social welfare is lower with complete markets than with
nancial autarky. This result reects the existence of a distortion associated to
the presence of learning, which generates inecient consumption imbalances, char-
2For example, the weights that would implement the competitive equilibrium under rational
expectations.
6acterized by more consumption going to the more optimistic agent.3 We also show
a time and state dependent tax on borrowing that restores the rst best.
Several papers study the consequences of introducing some kind of heterogene-
ity in the learning process followed by dierent groups of agents. Most of them
consider linear (or linearized) forward looking models, where endogenous variables
depend (among other things) on expectations that dierent individuals compute
in dierent ways, and derive the implications of this heterogeneity for the long run
behavior of the model; examples in this vein are Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) and
Berardi (2007). We show that taking into account the existence of nonlinearities
might have relevant consequences when analyzing the interaction of heterogenous
learning with the complete markets assumption. Caprioli (2008) derive similar
results in an optimal scal policy framework: when markets are complete and
private sector is learning, initial beliefs matter also in the long run, conditioning
the optimal allocations obtained in the limit. Closer to our work is the paper
by Assenza and Berardi (2009), which analyzes a credit economy  a la Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) when expectations are not rational. They nd that, when the
learning mechanism used to update beliefs diers between borrowers and lenders,
eventually the former voluntarily decide to default on their debt. There are two
main dierences between our approach and the one adopted in Assenza and Berardi
(2009): (i) in our paper we do not introduce the nancial frictions that character-
ize the Kiyotaki and Moore model, and show that even in this plain vanilla setup
heterogeneous learning can lead one of the agents to accumulate an unsustainable
debt4; (ii) we focus on an involuntarily overborrowing, which is explicitly ruled
out by Assenza and Berardi (2009).
Another related strand of literature studies endowment economies with com-
plete markets when agents preferences dier from the standard von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility paradigm: they do not have full knowledge of the
probability assessment of the possible states of the world, and try to guard against
this form of ambiguity, also referred to as Knightian uncertainty. Liu (1998) shows
that, if ambiguity is modeled using maxmin expected utility, and agents dier in
their degree of Knightian uncertainty, the equilibrium prices and allocations are
indeterminate in absence of aggregate uncertainty, while they are determinate but
history dependent when aggregate uncertainty is introduced. Rigotti and Shannon
(2005) show instead that indeterminacy arise robustly also in presence of aggregate
uncertainty, if individual preferences over state contingent consumption bundles
are incomplete as in Bewley (2002).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
3See the next section for a denition of what we mean by \optimistic" in this paper.
4However, in our setup agents never default in equilibrium, because the existence of borrowing
limits stops the exploding path of debt before it becomes too high to be repaid.
7and derives the individual optimality conditions under the two polar settings of
nancial autarky and complete markets. Section 3 characterizes the competitive
equilibrium when markets are complete, in the benchmark case of rational expec-
tations and under learning, shows how the learning allocations evolve over time,
and provides sucient conditions ensuring that debt limits bind in equilibrium.
Section 4 is devoted to the impact of learning on the eciency properties of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two agents in the economy, denoted by i = 1;2.5 In each period t  0
there is a realization of a stochastic event st 2 S, which is publicly observable;
we assume that the stochastic process fstg is exogenous and Markov, and has
a continuous support. Let the history of events up and until time t be denoted
by st  [s0;s1;:::;st], and the probability density function of st by f (st). Agent
i receives a stochastic endowment !i
t (st) that depends on the history st, and
purchases a history-dependent consumption bundle ci

















where  2 (0;1), ci
 is shorthand notation for ci
 (s)6, and u() is an increasing,
twice continuously dierentiable, strictly concave function, that satises standard
Inada conditions; moreover, we assume that this one-period utility function repre-
sents homothetic preferences. Note that the operator b Ei
t represents the conditional
expectations of agent i, which are not necessarily rational. We study the model
under two hypothesis for nancial markets: (i) in the rst case we assume nancial
autarky, so that each agent has no possibility to transfer wealth across time and
states; (ii) alternatively, we assume that at each date t  0 households have access
to spot markets for bonds contingent on all possible realizations of st+1 (Arrow
securities); we denote by bi
t (s;st) an Arrow security that pays one unit of con-
sumption at t + 1 if and only if st+1 = s, and it is competitively traded at price
pb
t (s).
5We interpret the agents as dierent households; alternatively, they could represent countries,
as in Kim and Kim (2003).
6We suppress the explicit dependence on s when it does not cause any ambiguity; otherwise,
we switch back to the original notation ci
 (s)
82.1 Financial Autarky
In the polar case of nancial autarky, agent i chooses the consumption plan that







t is shorthand notation for !i
t (st), and we assume that it can be observed






for each i and t. Note that under nancial autarky the degree of rationality of the
agents plays no role.
2.2 Complete Markets
Under this alternative market structure, each household faces a sequence of budget























Moreover, we have to impose some restrictions on asset trades to prevent Ponzi
scheme. We choose to impose state-by-state debt limits that, for any history st,
coincide with the maximum amount that agent i can repay starting from t, in case
her consumption is forever equal to a xed proportion " of aggregate endowment;
we call them "-natural debt limits.7 Finally, we assume that consumption of agent
i cannot fall below a proportion " of aggregate endowment. We write these two

















t  "!t (6)
where !t  !1
t + !2
t is aggregate endowment. Under rational expectations (RE
hereafter), constraints (5) and (6) are usually imposed with " = 0, and preferences
alone are sucient to guarantee that they are never biding in equilibrium; since,
as we argue below, this is not the case when RE are replaced with learning, CRRA
7For a discussion on natural debt limits and complete markets under RE, see Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004), Ch. 8.
9preferences could result in utility equal to  1. To prevent this unrealistic out-
come, throughout the rest of the paper we assume that " > 0.8 At time t, agent
i chooses ci
t (st) and bi
t (s;st) for any s 2 S to maximize (1) subject to (4), (5)
and (6). Let's denote with ,  and  the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (4),
















































t+1 (s;st) is the value of the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint
that, at time t, agent i expects to hold in period t + 1 if st+1 = s; this be-
lief can deviate from the true value if either the consumption in t + 1, when
st+1 = s, is dierent from the expected one (i.e., if b ci
t+1 (s;st) 6= ci
t+1 (s;st)), or
if the conditional probability density function is not correctly anticipated (i.e., if
b fi (st+1 = sjst) 6= f (st+1 = sjst)), or if both of these sources of non-rationality






optimum for household i is characterized by the FOCs (7) and (8), the sequence
of budget constraints (4) with the sign of equality, the sequences of additional
constraints (5) and (6) plus the appropriate complementary slackness conditions.
Note that we assume that agents take beliefs as given: in Kreps (1998) terminology,
they are anticipated utility maximizers.
3 Equilibrium Allocations with Complete Mar-
kets
Starting from the individual optimality conditions derived above, we now dene
the complete markets equilibrium.9
Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of beliefs b ci
t+1 (s;st) and b fi (st+1 = sjst)











1. for i = 1;2, given prices and beliefs, the consumption allocations satisfy agent
i's optimality conditions;
8Nevertheless, it is easy to show that, for " suciently small, constraints (5) and (6) would
still be non-binding under RE.
9In the following denition, we implicitly assume that initial wealth of agents is zero
(bi
 1 (s0) = 0 for all i).








t for all t and all realiza-
tions of st, and the bond market clearing conditions b1
t (s;st) + b2
t (s;st) = 0
for all t, all realizations of st and s.
This denition leaves open the determination and evolution of beliefs: allocations
and prices depend not only on the realization of the exogenous state st, but also
on some parameters characterizing the specic assumptions on beliefs' determina-
tion.10 Let's start considering an economy where all the agents have RE, namely
b ci
t+1 (s;st) = ci
t+1 (s;st) and b fi (st+1 = sjst) = f (st+1 = sjst) for any i, s and t.
Under this hypothesis, the competitive equilibrium of the model is well known,
namely each household consumes a fraction of aggregate endowment !t  !1
t +!2
t
that is constant across time and states:
c
1





1    
RE
!t





t for any t; in this case, it is easy to show that  RE = 1    RE = 1
2.
In the rest of this section we characterize the competitive equilibrium under
adaptive learning. In order to departure only slightly from RE, we retain the
assumption that the conditional probability density function of the exogenous
shocks is perfectly known by the agents; hence, the unique change with respect to
the baseline framework is that we do not impose that b ci
t+1 (s;st) = ci
t+1 (s;st).
Moreover, in the rest of the paper we suppose that the one-period utility func-




1  ; if  6= 1
log(c); if  = 1
(9)
where  > 0 denotes risk aversion.
3.1 Allocations when the debt limits are not binding
We start by assuming that, analogously to the RE case, the constraints (5) and
(6) are not binding; this step will allow us to analyze under which conditions such
an outcome can be sustained in equilibrium.























10In case of the learning algorithm considered below, endogenous variables depend on the
initial conditions of beliefs and of tracking parameters; in order to simplify notation, we do not
indicate explicitly this dependence.
11Note that the fact that b ci
t+1 (s;st) can be dierent from ci
t+1 (s;st) does not mean
that anything goes, and that any kind of beliefs can be supported in a competitive
equilibrium. In fact, dividing equation (10) for agent 1 by the analogous relation














for any s. In other words, at time t the ratio of the one-step-ahead marginal
utility of consumption forecasted by the two households has to be independent
of the realization of st+1. When markets are complete and debt limits are not
binding, even with non-rational expectations relative consumption is smoothed
across states; as we will see below, departing from RE implies that typically it
cannot be smoothed across time, and consumption allocations become history
dependent. Intuitively, when agents are learning, equilibrium consumption depends
not only on the history of exogenous states st, but also on the initial conditions
of beliefs. Arrow securities are not sucient to equalize consumption: there is a
missing market, because agents cannot diversify away dierences in initial beliefs.
Note that, if beliefs do not satisfy equation (11) for any s, then trade in contin-
gent assets would be endogenously restricted: debt limits for some Arrow securities
should bind in equilibrium, while those for some others would not. In what follows
we choose beliefs that rule out this possibility, in order to minimize the departure
from RE.
Given (11), a natural way to model individual expectations is to posit a per-
ceived law of motion (PLM):
c
i
t =  
i
t!t (12)
for i = 1;2. Combining (11) with (12), and using the denition of the one-period











Using this equation to substitute out c2
t from the goods market clearing condition,


















t +  2
t
!t (15)





















12We assume that agents update their beliefs using a (generalized) recursive least
squares (RLS) learning algorithm of the form:
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for i = 1;2. The values i
t are positive, deterministic, and non-increasing gain
sequences that represents how much agent i's expectations are updated in the
direction of the last forecast error; in other words, the higher is i
t, the less \con-














Note that we allow heterogeneity in agents' learning schemes along three dimen-
sions: (i) in the initial beliefs  i
0, which captures dierences in relative optimism11,
(ii) in the initial gain i
1, which captures dierences in relative condence12, and
(iii) in the initial estimates of the unconditional second moment of the aggregate
endowment process, Ri
0. As a result, the variable i
t (Ri
t)
 1 may dier between
the agents; it implies that the same forecast error would yield dierent revisions
of the estimated  i's: if agent 1 is more condent and/or believes the aggregate
endowment to be more noisy, she pays less attention to the forecast error. We
dene this heterogeneity as a dierence in relative volatility-adjusted condence.
We do not restrict the  i
t's to add up to one, as would be the case under RE:
since decisions are decentralized, and households have no knowledge about how
the rest of the economy forms its beliefs and decides its actions, it seems natural to
posit that there is no mechanism that makes individual forecasts mutually consis-
tent.13 When  1
t + 2
t is larger (smaller) than one we say that market is optimistic
(pessimistic).
To study the asymptotic behavior of agents' beliefs, we proceed along the lines
of Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) and stack together the learning algorithms (17)-









Then we can write:




0 >  2
0, we say that agent 1 is more optimistic than agent 2, and viceversa.
12The interpretation of the initial gain as an indicator of condence is adopted in Adam,
Marcet, and Nicolini (2009).
13Instead, market forces, that operate through bond prices, guarantee that actual individual
consumption allocations are mutually consistent.
13where Xt  (!t;!t 1)
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Equation (20) is a recursive stochastic algorithm of the standard form studied
in stochastic approximation literature, and we analyze its asymptotic properties
using the tools presented in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We dene an associated
ordinary dierential equation (ODE):
d
d
= h(); where h() = lim
t!1EH (;Xt) (23)
and observe that the set of its locally stable xed points coincides with the set 	
of locally stable xed points of the simpler ODE:
d 
d
= T ( )     (24)
where    ( 1; 2)
0
. If   2 	, we say that   is E-stable. Under suitable regularity
conditions, learning converges locally to   if and only if   is E-stable. One of
these regularity condition is the assumption that all the rest points of (24) are
locally isolated; instead, if there is a non-trivial connected set of rest points of
(24) (as is the case when the derivative of T ( )  , evaluated at   has at least a
zero eigenvalue), Evans and McGough (2005a) and Evans and McGough (2005b)
propose an alternative denition of E-stability: a continuum 	 of rest points of
(24) is E-stable if, for any   2 	, the derivative of T ( )     evaluated at   has
eigenvalues with negative real part, apart from zero eigenvalues arising from the
connectedness of 	. We are now ready to state and prove the following Proposition.









2 :  
1
= k;  
2
= 1   k;8k 2 [0;1]

is E-stable in the sense of Evans and McGough (2005a) and Evans and McGough
(2005b).
14Proof. See the Appendix.
This result implies that also the long-term fraction of total endowment con-
sumed by agent i can take any value, depending on where the beliefs converge. In
turn, this is determined not only by the realization of the shock process f!tg
1
t=0,
but also by time 0 relative optimism and relative condence of the households:
initial conditions matter, and they inuence the behavior of the economy also in
the limit. In presence of heterogeneous learning, dierences in initial beliefs are
not damped over time, and expectations-driven consumption imbalances are not
orderly unwind.14
In other words, consumption allocations given by (14) and (15) are non-ergodic.
This feature is not novel in a complete markets model with sequential trading: un-
der RE, it is well known that the steady-state wealth distribution is undetermined,
and the long-run wealth distribution actually reached by the economy is pinned
down by initial conditions on wealth. Our results extends this non-ergodicity
property to individual beliefs: when they are not pinned down by the RE hypoth-
esis, initial dierences in optimism and condence exerts a persistent inuence on
allocations.
3.2 When are the debt limits binding?
This non-ergodicity raises the natural question of whether any consumption allo-
cations given by (14) and (15) (together with initial conditions for the  i's, the
i's and the Ri's) can be sustained in an equilibrium where debt limits never bind;
since these allocations satisfy by construction the Euler equations (10), for i = 1;2,
all we have to do is to check under which conditions the budget constraints hold
for any t and st, if consumption is determined by the candidate equilibrium (14)-
(15). It turns out to be useful to rewrite the sequence of period-by-period budget
constraints in terms of the intertemporal constraint that must hold in period 0;
adapting the results obtained in Caprioli (2008), it is possible to show that the
competitive equilibrium (if debt limits never bind) can equivalently be character-




















for i = 1;2, where Ai

















14Note that, in the case of a continuum of possible equilibria, no theoretical connection between
E-stability and real-time learning is known; however, below we analyze in greater details the
dynamics induced by learning, providing support to our focus on E-stability.
15with initial condition Ai













































t >  RE for any t and st,
simple inspection shows that the rst term in the above condition turns out to be
strictly positive. We can summarize these results as follows.





t   RE for any t and st, with
the strict inequality holding for at least one T < 1; then, agent I's debt grows
unboundedly.
This Lemma provides sucient conditions under which debt limits must bind
in equilibrium, to prevent Ponzi schemes: if one agent consumes more than in the
benchmark RE case for some periods, then she must consume less in other periods.
We now turn to analyze in greater details the dynamics induced by learning, and
show that the condition of Lemma 1 is satised for a large set of possible initial
beliefs so that, at some point in time, the debt limit (5) must become binding.
A few preliminary observations are worth mentioning. If  1
0 +  2





0 =  i
0, and beliefs remain constant: the economy starts from a self-conrming
equilibrium, where incoming data never contradicts agents' beliefs. Hence, the
long-run distribution of consumption under the candidate equilibrium (14)-(15) is
trivially given by ( 1
0; 2
0).
In the general case of  1
0 +  2
0 6= 1 dynamics are more interesting, and depend
on relative volatility-adjusted condence in the following way.
Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, let's assume that  1
0 +  2
0 > 1.15
If consumption allocations are given by (14)-(15), then for any realization of
the aggregate endowment process f!t (st)g
1






















 1, then the consumption ratio is
constant over time.
Proof. See the Appendix.
15When  1
0 +  2
0 < 1, symmetric results hold.
16This result has a simple intuition. If market is initially optimistic, the variable
 1
0 +  2
0 has to gradually diminish towards one. The cost of the adjustment is
not necessarily borne by the two agents in the same proportion; the household




is going to revise downwards her beliefs at a smaller pace, hence putting the
heaviest burden on the other household's shoulders. In turn, this means that her
consumption, relative to the other agent consumption, grows over time, converging
to a higher level than the one it started from. If the household initially more
optimistic happens to be the one which is also more condent, Proposition 2 states
that her consumption should be larger than the other households consumption
at any t. Hence, combining Lemma 1 with Proposition 2, we get the following
Corollary.
Corollary 1. Let's assume that  1
0 +  2
0 > 1, and that  1








 1, then there exists a time period T < 1 such that agent 1's debt limit (5)
binds at T.
The fact that the debt limit becomes binding, together with the existence of
the constraint (6), means that household 1 consumption drops to " and remains
constant at this level. In other words, if the interaction between heterogeneous
non-rational beliefs and complete markets allows an agent to consume in the rst
periods more than what she would be entitled to under RE, she accumulates debt
that has to repay contracting consumption in the rest of her life. Notice that only
slight departures from RE are necessary to deliver this outcome: even if the  i
0's
are arbitrarily close to (but dierent from)  RE, the debt limit will eventually be
reached. This is a consequence of the fact that, as argued above, Arrow securities
are enough to smooth consumption across states, but not across time; hence, non-
ergodicity of the allocations implies that even small initial dierences in beliefs
are sucient to induce persistent consumption imbalances that can violate the
no-Ponzi condition.16
If instead the household initially more optimistic happens to be the one which
is less condent, Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that in the long run she
consumes less than the other household, hence potentially satisfying the intertem-
poral budget constraint (25). Numerical simulations shows that, for some initial
conditions for  i's and i's, this is actually the case.
16This result hinges on the hypothesis that, when debt limits are not binding, consumption
allocations depend on forecasts computed only one step ahead. Assuming that agents use long-
horizon forecasts to decide today's consumption, along the lines put forward by Preston (2005),
might help to pin down a long run equilibrium that, independently of the initial beliefs, satises
the no-Ponzi condition. This is left as a relevant topic for future research.
173.2.1 Special case: no aggregate uncertainty
In the rest of this section we simplify the model assuming that there is no aggre-
gate uncertainty; this simplication allows us to get even sharper results on the
conditions ensuring that debt limits never bind in equilibrium.
We normalize to one the constant aggregate endowment. As is common in the
literature on two types, the shock is assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated
across the agents; hence, we can write !1
t (st) = st and !2
t (st) = 1   st, where
st can take values between zero and one. Consumption in agents' PLM is now a
constant; we modify the agent i's learning algorithm accordingly:
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t's are still given by (19). Equation (27) makes clear that, when debt
limits are not binding,  i's are deterministic sequences in absence of aggregate
uncertainty. This implies that also consumption allocations and marginal utili-
ties are independent of stochastic shocks. We can use this result to rewrite the
























2. Let's consider the case of an economy characterized by initial beliefs such that
 1
0 +  2
0 > 1, and  1
0 >  2
0; by Proposition 2 we know that equation (28) can hold
only if 1
1 > 2
1. Hence, for any value of  1
0,  2
0 and 2
1 such that  1
0 + 2
0 > 1, and
 1
0 >  2

































As argued above, for 1
1  2
1 we have that F 1 () > 0; moreover, F 1 () is continu-
ous. Hence, if it were also monotonic decreasing, we could conclude by the Inter-
mediate Value Theorem that there is at most one value of 1
1 such that F 1 () = 0;
numerical simulations conrm that F 1 () is indeed monotonic decreasing.17 We
17The results are available from the author upon request. We conjecture that it should be






1) this value, if it exists. Next, we dene the set of all the
possible initial conditions of beliefs and gains as   [0;1]4, and the subset of 
such that  1
0 +  2
0 > 1,  1
0 >  2
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By the same token, if  1
0 +  2
0 > 1 and  1
0 <  2
0, for 1
1  2
1 we have that
F 1 () < 0; moreover, also in this case numerical simulations suggest that F 1 ()




1) is unique, if it exists.
Let's dene the subset of  such that  1
0 + 2
0 > 1,  1
0 <  2
0 and the intertemporal
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all the initial conditions such that  1
0 +  2
0 < 1 and the intertemporal budget
constraint (28) holds. Finally, when  1
0 +  2
0 = 1 we know that the economy
starts from a self-conrming equilibrium; in this case, the intertemporal budget
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To sum up, the set of all the initial conditions of beliefs and gains such that




















Note all the sets composing  are subsets of R4 whose dimension is strictly smaller
than 4; hence, their Lebesque measure  is zero. By subaddittivity, we conclude
that () = 0.
Remark 1. Numerical investigations show that the set of all the initial conditions
of beliefs and gains such that the intertemporal budget constraint (28) holds has
Lebesque measure zero; hence, there exists typically a time T < 1 starting from
which the debt limit of one of the agents starts binding.
4 Welfare
The assumption that agents have non-rational expectations, updated according
to a learning algorithm, introduces a distortion in the complete markets setup.
19Hence, in this section we study the implications of this distortion for the eciency
properties of the competitive equilibrium. We rst consider how a full nancial
integration, namely a shift from nancial autarky to complete markets, aects
social welfare, and then we turn to analyze to what extent the First and Second
Welfare Theorems hold in our framework.
4.1 Pitfalls of Financial Integration when Agents are Learn-
ing



















where i is the (non-negative) Pareto weight attached on individual i's utility. No-
tice that the expectations in (30) are rational: the social planner fully knows how
the agents behave. We can now evaluate U0 under nancial autarky (denoted by
UA
0 ) and under complete markets (denoted by UC
0 ). It is well known that, when ex-
pectations are rational, the former is smaller than the latter; instead, in our setting
this is not always the case. To show formally this nding, we again concentrate
on the economy with no aggregate uncertainty; in this setting the rational planner
can exactly compute at time 0 the whole sequence of future agents' beliefs, since
they are non-stochastic. In the general case this is not possible anymore, and the
calculation of E0 i
t!t would become pretty much involved; however, we conjecture
that it should not aect the main conclusion.
Proposition 3. Let   1; then, for any i, with i = 1;2, there exist initial
conditions for individual beliefs  i
0 and gain parameters i
1, and a set of values of
" such that UC
0 < UA
0 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, for empirically plausible values of risk aversion, nancial integration
can be detrimental for social welfare. If agents' utility function is suciently con-
cave, when markets are complete the increase in across-time average consumption
dierential with respect to RE, due to expectations-driven consumption imbal-
ances and, possibly, binding debt limits, has the potential to more than oset
the reduction in volatility stemming from the across-states smoothing allowed by
Arrow securities. This result shows to what extent the consumption imbalances
created by the interaction between learning and market completeness can drive
the economy far from an equilibrium grounded in fundamentals.
20Our Proposition assumes exogenous weights i; in particular, they are inde-
pendent of  0. To overturn the result stated in Proposition 3, the social welfare
function should attach a higher weight to the household that is bounded to con-
sume more in the long run, with respect to what would be optimal under RE. It is
worth noting that also under RE, if we consider i that do not depend on initial
conditions (in particular, on the initial wealth distribution), a result analogous to
Proposition 3 could be obtained; the novel feature of our setting is that also ini-
tial beliefs of the households are now crucial to assess the desirability of nancial
innovation.
4.2 Eciency
The rst best allocations can be found maximizing equation (30) subject to tech-
nological constraints and initial conditions. It is easy to show18 that the solution












To gauge the source of the distortion introduced by learning, we can compare
it with the analogous optimality condition that holds in a competitive equilibrium,










t ; if debt limits are not binding
"
1 "; if debt limit for agent 1 is binding
(32)
It is clear that in both instances relative consumption is independent of the realiza-
tions of individual endowments, due to market completeness; however, in the rst
best relative consumption is also independent of time and of aggregate endowment,
while it is not the case in the competitive equilibrium (unless the following condi-
tion hold:  1
0 =  2
0 = 1
2). The equivalence between Pareto optima and competitive
equilibria breaks down in this environment.
Our decentralized equilibrium can be seen as the outcome of a command econ-
omy in which the planner has time-varying Pareto weights that evolve in a suitable















which makes possible the equivalence with the allocation implied by equation (32),
as long as the time-varying weights track the evolution of beliefs: the planner deliv-
ers more and more consumption to the agent who (in the competitive equilibrium)
18See, among others, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), Ch. 8.
21is more and more optimistic. If a debt limit binds in the competitive equilibrium
at some T < 1, from T on the planner should deliver less consumption to the
over-indebted household.
This result can be related to the literature on insurance with limited commit-
ment; when households are free to renege their debt, Marcet and Marimon (1998)
show that the optimal allocations can be interpreted as the solution to a stan-
dard planner problem with Pareto weights that shift over time in such a way that
consumers never want to default: when the participation constraint of a given
household is binding, her consumption is increased for many periods.
If we want to achieve the rst best in the more general case of xed Pareto
weights, we should introduce some other distortion in the individual problem de-
signed in such a way to oset the one stemming from learning. The most straight-
forward way to do so is to modify the budget constraint of the households, intro-
ducing a distortionary tax on borrowing i
t. In order to guarantee that the scal
authority budget is balanced in every period, and that the rst best consumption






















































t ; if debt limits are not binding
"
1 "; if debt limit for agent 1 is binding
(35)
If the planner set taxes as a function of beliefs in such a way that the right hand






every period, the competitive equilibrium allocations
replicate the Pareto optimum associated with the weights 1 and 2, and debt lim-
its never bind. In particular, it should tax more the agent who is \too" optimistic
with respect to the ratio of Pareto weights, in order to contain her consumption.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple endowment economy inhabited by two
agents, which receive idiosyncratic shocks to their income, can trade in a full array
of Arrow securities, and face debt limits to prevent Ponzi schemes. We depart from
the standard full-insurance model by assuming that individuals are not rational,
but form their beliefs in a way consistent with the adaptive learning literature;
22the algorithm they use to update their one-step-ahead consumption expectations
might display heterogeneity in terms of initial conditions.
We found that also in our setting market completeness is enough to smooth
consumption across states of nature; however, the learning process hampers the
possibility to smooth consumption across time, and imparts to the system dynam-
ics that are not present under rational expectations. Asymptotically, the impact
of initial beliefs does not fade away, and it contributes to determine the consump-
tion allocations characterizing the self-conrming equilibrium where the economy
settles down: when market is initially optimistic, the consumption of the more
condent household, relative to the other agent's consumption, tends to grow over
time. Hence, it either converges to a higher level than the one it started from, if
this consumption plan does not entail the accumulation of an innitely large debt,
or face a sudden drop, when the debt limit starts binding. The opposite holds
when market is initially pessimistic.
Moreover, the introduction of learning also aects eciency properties of the
competitive equilibrium, and suggests that dierences in individual beliefs should
be taken into account by policymakers when designing nancial innovation. In
fact, if we consider a social planner that attaches to the dierent agents xed
Pareto weights, we show that there exists a conguration of individual expecta-
tions such that social welfare is lower with complete markets than with nancial
autarky. This result reects the existence of a distortion associated to the presence
of learning, which generates inecient consumption imbalances, characterized by
more consumption going to the more optimistic agent. We also show a time and
state dependent tax on borrowing that restores the rst best.
We want to emphasize that this paper features only a slight departure from
rational expectations: each agent understands her individual maximization prob-
lem and how to solve it, and knows the probability distribution of the exogenous
shocks. The only source of bounded rationality is the lack of knowledge of how
the other household forms her decisions, which is a relevant piece of information to
correctly forecast own future consumption in a general equilibrium model where
prices, that might diverge from their rational expectations value, guarantee market
clearing. Moreover, in the long run the economy settles down in a self-conrming
equilibrium, so that expectations become asymptotically model consistent. Even
so, our results show that easing the rational expectations hypothesis might have
signicant implications, hence strengthening the case for a careful consideration
of private sector beliefs when designing nancial innovation policies.
23Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We start noting that rest points of equation (24) must
satisfy the following condition:
 
 1
 1+ 2    1
 2
 1+ 2    2
!
= 0 (A.1)
Simple inspection conrms that, when  i's are between 0 and 1, the above equation
is satised for any point in the set 	 dened in the statement of the Proposition.
To check E-stability, we compute the Jacobian DT   I:
















When evaluated at any of the points in 	, it is easy to show that the eigenvalues
of the above matrix are  1 and 019, hence completing the proof.
We now state and prove a short technical Lemma, which will be useful in the
proof of Proposition 2












 1 for any t > 1.
















Given the recursive law of motion of Ri

























The above equation, together with some simple algebra, allows us to write:








































19In fact, the trace of the matrix is  1, while the determinant is equal to 0.






for i = 1;2. Plugging this equivalent representation into equation (A.3), we get:






















which can be manipulated to conclude that:
Gt ? 0 , Gt 1 ? 0
A trivial inductive argument completes the proof.








t ; moreover, using equa-
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The condition (A.5) is written in terms of i's, Ri's and  i's at time t, while the
statement of the Proposition is in terms of initial condence and beliefs. However,













 1 for any t < 1; hence, all remains to show is that, if  1
0 +  2
0 > (<)1,
then  1
t +  2
t  ()1 for any t < 1. To do this, we use equation (17) to obtain:
 
1
t +  
2
t =  
1
















































from the above equation, simple algebra shows that:
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t ? 1 ,  
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2 < 1, equa-
tion (A.6) shows that  1
t 1+ 2
t 1 > 1 implies that  1
t + 2
t > 1. A trivial inductive
argument completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Here we sketch the proof, which is based on the fact












in the social welfare function gets arbitrarily close to  1 when consumption of one
of the two agents approaches zero. Given Proposition 2, if 1
1 = 2
1 the consumption
allocations remain at their initial level, as long as debt limits don't bind. Therefore,
we can pick an initial distribution of beliefs  0 such that c1 is arbitrarily close to
0 as long as debt limits don't bind. By Lemma 1, the debt limit for agent 2 starts
binding from some T < 1, and we can set " so that c2 is arbitrarily close to 0
from T on. This equilibrium is such that the term (A.7) is arbitrarily close to  1













, we could use an analogous procedure.
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